Military Operations in Urban Terrain
by Frank Morales
[domestic repression; military]

ou know, you never hear of suburban war," said Zulene Mayfield of the Chester (Pennsylvania) Residents Concerned for Quality Living (CRCQL), "always urban war. Why is that?"1 She and scores of other American citizens are up in arms (so to speak) over the recent series of urban war games executed by the Marines and Special Forces in some 20 cities across the U.S., code- named "Operation Urban Warrior." On May 13, 1999, "acting under the cloak of darkness, 100 Army Special Operations troops descended on two vacant public housing complexes in three training exercises and terrified nearby residents and surprised even the housing director.... Residents of the areas around the two projects, some of whom were notified hours beforehand of a law enforcement training exercise, said they found the experience startling and intimidating."2 Defining the exercise as a law enforcement training exercise was appropriate, since most of the troops were dressed as police.

"This is beyond reasoning, people are traumatized and terrified, Vietnam vets are experiencing flashbacks," said Mayfield. Many in the Chester community are angry "with the arrogance of all parties involved," and are determined to "deal with the local government, which has been totally unresponsive." On June 1, the citizens of Chester marched to the home of Mayor Dominic Pileggi, who refused, or was unable, to answer questions about the military invasion. Targeting their local Congressman, Bob Brady, the public housing residents of Chester are trying to get some answers as to why their community was subjected to "no- notice" exercises using real ammunition and explosives. And despite the military's disclaimer that they are using "less than lethal" bombs and bullets, this is little consolation to the terrified residents of Chester. As Mayfield sees it, "if they are using disintegrating bullets, why are the windows blown out?"

In some earlier cases involving similar exercises the Army had been asked to leave town. In March 1997, after public outcry, Charlotte, North Carolina, officials canceled the exercises after the first night of a would- be three- night stand. Likewise, the Army cut short its stay in Houston and Pittsburgh when the exercises—with fatigue- clad soldiers bearing arms and setting off minor charges—prompted fears among the citizenry.3

Angered by "the misrepresentation of the proposed training exercise," Charlotte Mayor Patrick McCrory, wrote President Clinton, stating that "on the night of March 4 [1997], residents of the uptown neighborhoods were stunned by the sudden appearance of 12 low- flying helicopters without lights, in possible violation of FAA regulations. There were snipers on rooftops shooting live ammunition at fake targets. Explosive devices were set off, creating a tremendous amount of noise. Given these conditions and the large number of military personnel in the area, neighborhood residents were in fear. Many of them called 911 to get what scant information was available, and many of them called me at home. I could hardly hear some of them because of the noise." As a result of pressure generated by outraged citizens of Charlotte, "we insisted the DOD cancel the exercise scheduled for later that week, and it is unlikely we would be willing to host any future activities of this type."4 It might have also been related to the fact that some residents began "carrying weapons in case the troops arrived."5 Army Special Operations spokesman Walter Sokalski offered the lame excuse that "this Army saves lives. We want to thank the communities for being a part of saving lives in the future."6

The Army was also rebuffed in San Francisco in February when protests shut down a portion of the exercise which was to involve "five ships, 6,000 sailors and Marines, and four days of simulated combat using helicopters and F- 18 bombers, tens of thousands of blank rounds of small arms fire, and simulated explosions."7 Other cities that have experienced the little- or- no- notice drills include Jacksonville, Florida; Chicago; the Corpus Christi area of Texas; New York; Charleston, South Carolina; and Oakland, California, which, unlike its neighbor across the bay, welcomed the military. "If San Francisco didn't want it, we're happy to accommodate," said Stacey Wells, press secretary to Oakland Mayor Jerry Brown.8

Cities that were targeted for the war games had a few things in common. One was the near total lack of information or warning passed on to the residents, including city officials, prior to the onslaught. Except for the occasional police chief, almost no one was let in on the planned "exercises," and when they were, they were sworn to secrecy.

Another characteristic was "the satchel full of cash" the military used to bribe officials into compliance and pay for damages. For example, even though the Army wasn't asked to pay for damages to an old police building in Kingsville, Texas, because it was going to be torn down anyway, the fire marshal and the other officials said the Army promptly paid the police and fire departments for their time. "They paid cash money. They had a satchel ready to go."9 In another instance, in early 1998 Army officials approached San Antonio, Texas, Mayor Howard Peak, about training in San Antonio, but he refused to give his consent because the Army would not divulge the details of the operation. At that point, he said, "they tried to go around us and offer money to people for their support, which was very unfortunate."10

Since 1994, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command, at Fort Bragg, in Fayetteville, North Carolina, has conducted (or attempted to conduct) the series of "Operation Urban Warrior" training exercises. The stated rationale for the Marine exercises is "the expectation that future wars are increasingly likely to be waged on city streets."11 Part of the operation's mission and goals include the enhancement of "domestic national security," with the goal of conducting combat operations "in an urban environment against a backdrop of civil unrest, and restore order."12

Col. Mark Thiffault, Director, Joint Information Bureau, Operation Urban Warrior, stresses that "potential foes view cities as a way to limit the technological advantages of our military. They know that cities, and their narrow streets, confusing layout and large number of civilian non- combatants, place limits on our technological superiority and especially our use of firepower. We have to develop technologies that allow us to win while minimizing collateral damage."13

"Warfighting"

The "Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment" in March examined "new concepts, tactics, techniques and procedures, and technologies to meet the challenges of conflict" in urban areas, where "by 2020, approximately seventy percent of the world's population will live." Operation Urban Warrior's internet home page recently ended public access to its website sector on "marines prepared for protesters."14

The theory and tactics of urban warfare, currently under vigorous scrutiny by numerous sectors of the military, fall under the subject of Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT). The primary U.S. Army publication on the subject, Field Manual 90- 10, published in August 1979, recently updated as FM 90- 10- 1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built- up Areas. Despite this reformulation, George J. Mordica II, an analyst for the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), feels it needs reworking. He states that "U.S. doctrine on combat operations in urban areas is outdated." His recommendation is that "tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) need to be developed as an interim measure until doctrine can be written that supports armed combat." Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 3- 35.3, Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain, published in 1998 by the Marine Corps, was praised by Mordica as the most realistic; he likes "the Marine Corps' current Urban Warrior experiment," believing it offers "a different approach and fresh review of many of the questions the Army needs to address."

One of these questions concerns weaponry: "Develop weapons based on the need to defeat the threat, not on political considerations concerning whether such a weapon would be used in a given situation." In addition, "a high- level review of the ammunition necessary in urban combat must be conducted. The use of high- explosive plastic, white phosphorus, and flechette rounds need to be evaluated and considered for re- introduction into the inventory in sufficient quantities for effective training. Satchel charges, explosives, and bangalore torpedoes should also be re- evaluated for use in urban conditions." White phosphorus, used in flares, as an incendiary and for smoke screens, comes in every size from hand grenades to howitzer shells and is, according to the EPA, extremely toxic to humans.15

Finally, Mordica and the Army Center believe that, "the training we are using to prepare our soldiers for urban combat is not realistic enough to present the full spectrum of command and control, along with the psychological impact, close combat, and logistical problems associated with this kind of combat." Firearms Training Systems, Inc., the experts in "virtual killing," recently consummated a "cooperative research and development agreement" with the Office of Naval Research to "commercialize" an "advanced training systems product line," in the hopes of "enhancing military and law enforcement training."16 They, like the Army's Mordica, know that "the sugar- coated version of urban combat will not reflect the truth. Battles in a city are savage, and many times do not allow for the precautions normally taken in the field concerning refugees, civilian casualties, evacuation of friendly and enemy wounded and dead, and prisoners of war (POWs)...." "Does this mean the Army cannot hold itself to a high moral code?" asks Mordica. Well, "No," but "the political realities of urban combat have created a terminology that tends to place limitations on how to conduct these operations ... these terms bring civility to urban combat operations."17

U.S. Marine Corps Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) "X- Files" contain "tactics, techniques and procedures" which deal with "urban attacks" (3- 35.1), "urban defense" (3- 35.2), "urban patrolling" (3- 35.6), and "urban sustainability" (3- 35.12). Unfortunately, "these files are accessible from the MILNET only," a classified computer network. According to the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, "the X- files are pocket- sized, useful, clear information" that "convey a synthesis of learning from experiments with MOUT tactics, techniques, and procedures, and some enabling technologies—that can help us fight and win battles on urbanized terrain."18

The Rand Corporation recently published a book by R.W. Glenn entitled, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat. In it, the author examines the state of "U.S. Military preparedness to undertake military operations in urban terrain (MOUT)." Glenn recommends that "the four services should adopt Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3- 35.3 as the initial foundation...."19

"Urbanized" Terrain

The 1998, MCWP 3- 35.3, "Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain," is written "with emphasis on the ground combat element," attempting to provide a "level of detailed information that supports the complexities of planning, preparing for, and executing small- unit combat operations on urbanized terrain." The 367- page publication covers a range of subjects, including modern urban warfare, offensive and defensive operations, logistics and combat support, organization, combat skills, and weaponry, with a series of appendices on attacking and clearing buildings, fighting positions, subterranean operations (subways and basements), mines and demolitions. The publication makes clear that urbanized areas are "an incredibly complicated and fluid environment," which "may be significant sources of future conflict." Noting that "cities historically are where radical ideas ferment, dissenters find allies, mixtures of people cause ethnic friction, and discontented groups receive media attention," the author(s) of  MCWP 3- 35.3 want it to be known that into this milieu, the Marines "are deployed as part of naval expeditionary forces (NEFs) that maintain a global forward presence for rapid crisis response," during which "urban intervention operations must often be planned and executed in a matter of hours or days (rather than weeks or months) to take advantage of the internal turmoil surrounding a developing crisis." 

Under the heading  "Military Operations Other Than War," the "Warfighting Publication" states in Chapter 7 that "one of the most likely missions that U.S. Marines will undertake abroad will be military operations other than war (MOOTW). These missions typically will take place in the Third World." During MOOTW, "it is important to remember that political considerations permeate at all levels."20

Endnotes:

Frank Morales is an Episcopal priest and independent researcher and pamphleteer who is active on Manhattan's Lower East Side.

1._Interview with author, May 1999.

2._Philadelphia Inquirer, "Army Uses Chester Public Housing For Training Exercises," May 18, 1999.

3._Ibid.

4._Mayor Patrick McCrory's Letter to President Clinton Protesting Army Urban Combat Exercises, Charlotte, N.C., Mar. 1997.

5._Corpus Christi Caller Times, "Army Trains Spurs Conspiracy Fears," Feb. 16, 1999.

6._Op. cit., n. 2.

7._Nando Media, "Marines Get Cold Shoulder in San Francisco, Welcomed in Oakland," Reuters News Service, June 1999.

8._Ibid.

9._"Invasion, South Texas," Austin American Statesman, Apr. 4, 1999.

10._Ibid.

11._"100 Marines in Jackson, Florida, Urban Control     Exercises,"  Jacksonville Times Union, July 24, 1998.

12._Operation Urban Warrior Homepage: www.defenselink.mil/specials/urbanwarrior.

13._Ibid.

14._Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Experiment, www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwl/- uw.html; see also, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab: Capable Warrior, www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil.

15._"President's Panel Not Satisfied with Navy's ‘Safety' Reports," Vieques Times, Aug. 1999; see www.viequestimes.com. The people of Vieques, Puerto Rico, have a lot of experience dealing with U.S. military weaponry.

16._United States Office of Naval Research, Technology Transfer, Industrial Outreach Division, Naval Air Warfare Center, Training Systems Division, www.onr.navy.mil/sci_tech/industrial/- wtet.htm. See Frank Morales, "The Militarization of the Police," CovertAction Quarterly, No. 67 (Spring- Summer 1999), p. 45.

17._George J. Mordica II, Analyst, Center for Army Lessons Learned, "It's a Dirty War, but Somebody has to do it" (n.d.). See also on the subject of MOUT, Gen. Charles C. Krulak, "The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War," Marines Magazine, Jan. 1999; Robert F. Hahn II and Bonnie Jezior, "Urban Warfare and the Urban Warfighter of  2025," Parameters Magazine, Summer 1999; interview with Lt. Gen. John Rhodes, head of U.S. Marines Combat Development Command, on the subject of "future warfighting," Jane's Defence Weekly, Vol. 29, No. 5; James Kitfield, untitled article dealing with "urban warfare as the inevitable wave of the future," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 81, No. 12 (Dec. 1998).

18._U.S. Marine Corps X- Files "are an evolving body of knowledge that will be refined and inserted into the Marine Corps Combat Development System when the Urban Warrior experiments are concluded." www.mcwl.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwl/home/xfiles/xfiles.html. See also USMC "Urban Warfare Joint Cultural Intelligence Seminar, Summary Report" Apr. 13, 1999, www.ootw.quantico.usmc. mil/cultural_seminar_urban_warfare.htm.

19._R.W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies: The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat, Rand, 1998 (quotes from RAND Abstract, DOCNO:MR- 1007- A).

20._Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3- 35.3, Military Operations in Urbanized Terrain, Dept. of the Navy, HQ, United States Marine Corps, Washington, D.C., Apr. 16, 1998. "Point of contact": Major Mark Sumner DSN 278- 6228; www.doctrine.quantico.usmc.mil/mcwp/htm/mcwp3353.htm.

Homeland Defense 1999

by Frank Morales

[domestic repression]

"Terrorism is multifaceted and differs from group to group and incident to incident. Yet the single common denominator is that it is a psychological weapon, intended to erode trust and undermine confidence in our government, its elected officials, institutions or policies. What makes a WMD [weapons of mass destruction] terrorist incident unique is that it can be a transforming event."

Frank J. Cilluffo,

Center for Strategic and

International Studies,

Council on Foreign Relations,

Roundtable on Terrorism

"I personally believe that the next decade is a decade of homeland defense...."

John Hamre

Deputy Secretary of Defense

This past January the New York Times stated in an editorial that "there have been discussions in the Pentagon, but no decision, about creating a new domestic military command to combat terrorism. That would erode the long- established legal principle that America's armed forces should not be involved in domestic law enforcement."1 While the military has "no intention of usurping civilian control," under the euphemistic banner of "homeland defense" the Pentagon "decided to ask President Clinton for the power to appoint a military leader for the continental United States."2 Recent testimony before a congressional committee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice stressed that "in order to institute a more systematic and integrative approach to protecting the Continental United States from threats such as WMD terrorism, critical infrastructure protection and missile defense, it may be worthwhile to create a new Commander- in- Chief (CINC) USA. The CINCUSA would be responsible for all Department of Defense- related strategies and activities related to homeland defense issues and would serve as a focal point and facilitate coordination within the Department of Defense and between the many federal, state and local law enforcement, intelligence and medical communities with related responsibilities."3

White House officials "reacted favorably, characterizing the proposed step as a relatively minor adjustment of the lines of military authority and organization." President Clinton, whose approval was required in order to move ahead with the appointment of the domestic military chief, commenced to "weighing the issue carefully," promising a response. His objectivity in the matter was doubtful all along, given his authorship of various directives on the matter, including in particular, Presidential Decision Directive 62, "Protection Against Unconventional Threats to the Homeland and Overseas," dated May 1998, and Presidential Decision Directive 39, a June 1995 presidential "counter- terrorism" edict which provides guidance in distinguishing "crisis management" from "consequence management." Gregory Nojeim, legislative counsel on national security for the American Civil Liberties Union, concerned about the Pentagon proposal and its impact on law enforcement, said "it's hard to believe that a soldier with a suspect in the sights of his M- 1 tank is well positioned to protect that person's civil liberties."

Nonetheless, for at least the past three years the Pentagon has organized and planned for "homeland defense." During that time, Defense Secretary William Cohen signed off "on a plan to create a Joint Task Force for Civil Support," in which military forces would be involved in various types of  "anti- terrorist" law- enforcement operations, reporting "to the Department of Justice, which has the lead not only in law enforcement but in coordinating the domestic response to terrorism."4 Actually, Cohen stated that "the joint task force to coordinate military actions would be ready to respond in the event of an attack on American soil, but under the direction of a civilian agency like the Federal Emergency Management Agency."5

On October 8, 1999, Pentagon foresight was rewarded when Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT), was put in charge of defending the homeland. According to script, President Clinton "approved these new changes made by the Pentagon's top officials as part of a routine revision of the responsibilities and roles of its nine commands scattered across the globe." According to this "routine revision," Admiral Gehman's new job "is to coordinate military actions should an enemy target this country...." Again, "the idea has been criticized by civil libertarians who argue that any homeland defense plan might open the door for the military to assume the role of domestic police, which is prohibited by law." In reference to the appointment of a domestic military chief, the ACLU's Nojeim stated that "our concern is that there be a bright line drawn between law enforcement and the military. This not only blurs that bright line," warned Nojeim, "but virtually guarantees further involvement of the military in civilian law enforcement activity."6

As for legal considerations, "by law, the military cannot make arrests or act in civil law enforcement. The Posse Comitatus Act, passed after the Civil War to rein in the military, bars federal troops from doing police work within United States borders."7 Comforting words from the New York Times. Unfortunately, not true. Strictly speaking, the Act refers only to the Army and the Air Force. In fact, militarism is increasingly imbedded within domestic law enforcement. Incredibly, the paper of record also declared that "the division of powers that bars the military from domestic law enforcement is similar to that between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency. The former does surveillance work at home and the latter abroad." Apparently, this division of powers did not prevent an innocent Redford, Texas teenager, 18- year- old Esequiel Hernandez Jr., not far from home, from being shot dead by Marines on a "drug interdiction" mission along the border. As for the FBI, the bureau in the 1990s has nearly doubled its overseas presence, having opened offices in more than 20 foreign countries. In addition, FBI Director Freeh recently stated that "the FBI and the Central Intelligence Agency have taken several steps to improve cooperation between agencies, including the exchange of deputies, exchange of personnel assigned to each agency's counter- terrorism center, joint meetings, and joint operational and analytical initiatives. At the field operational level, the FBI sponsors 18 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in major cities to maximize interagency cooperation and coordination among Federal, State, and local law enforcement."8

The 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, (18 U.S.C. § 1385), often cited as a barrier to domestic military activity, reads as follows: "Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both."  Under the so- called "drug war," "exceptions" to the Posse Comitatus Act have proliferated. "Former Senator Sam Nunn of Georgia, who specializes in National Security issues, said another exception became law in the Reagan Administration when Congress permitted Posse Comitatus to be waived in the event of nuclear terrorism." Congress later widened the exception in a "little known provision" sponsored by then Senator Nunn. Known as the Nunn- Lugar- Domenici Bill, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 gave "the Pentagon power to step in domestically in the event of chemical and germ attacks."9 The military, for its part, is making the very same arguments.

U.S. Army Colonel Sean J. Berne argues in a recent article for Military Review entitled, "Defending Sovereignty: Domestic Operations and Legal Precedents," that although "there continues to be considerable concern over the legal authority and limits of using the Armed Forces in domestic actions," and that some would even "argue against virtually any involvement by the military in domestic operations, that involvement is key to safeguarding national security and guaranteeing the continued freedom of our citizens." Berne asserts that "under specific circumstances, use of military forces in domestic operations, while controversial, is not only appropriate, but legal and warranted." The Colonel has little patience for "preconceived notions concerning civil- military relations based on incomplete information." While those who object to the military becoming the police usually cite, among other things, the Posse Comitatus Act, it is not, according to Colonel Berne, "the final word on the subject." He states that "based on emergency situations and emerging threats to national security, Congress passed a number of exceptions clearing the way for significantly increased involvement by the Armed Forces in domestic activities."

These "exceptions" to Posse Comitatus, or to put it in more precise language, these new missions for the military inside America, include Title 10, U.S.C. §§331- 35, dealing with civil disturbances and insurrection. These sections, and other "exceptions," according to Berne, "also provide the Executive and Legislative branches with a standing force involved with domestic law enforcement on a day- to- day basis." Now, "while at first blush it would appear these changes could be in conflict with the intent of the Declaration of Independence, the Constitution, and the Posse Comitatus Act, by placing a potentially unchecked military in a position to infringe on Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights," we should have no fear, taking comfort in the notion that our "Congress went to great lengths to ensure that ... civil- military relationships would not be subverted." And don't forget, we are reminded, that "no case has been found involving criminal prosecution of anyone for Posse Comitatus violations."10 So, let's get our heads screwed on right, because after all, as Col. Thomas R. Lujan, staff judge advocate for the U.S. Special Operations Command, said back in 1997, "our nation can ill afford to have the effectiveness of its military assets artificially constrained by a misunderstanding of the law."11

Along those same lines, the Air Force's Air University offered a 1998 course entitled "The Posse Comitatus Act: Consideration of Its Contemporary Value/Appropriateness." An abstract of the course states that "this project will review the history of the Posse Comitatus Act, the rationale for its existence, contemporary exceptions, and explore the logic for its continued existence and enforcement. If it is determined the Act is no longer necessary, consideration will be given to making a recommendation for modification or elimination of the Act."12 Finally, the U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute summed it up this way, in a slide entitled: "The Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. §1385)." It's simple: "Exceptions: Military Purpose Doctrine, Sovereign Authority, Civil Disturbances."13

This past year, President Clinton appointed Richard A. Clarke his national counter- terrorism coordinator, his point man on domestic counterinsurgency. Earlier this summer, Clarke wrote a piece for the journal Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, entitled, "The Intelligence Threat Assessment Function and the New Threats."14 During the Bush Administration, he was a staff member of the National Security Council and has remained there ever since. Sitting in Oliver North's old office at the NSC, Clarke is trying mightily to "coordinate everything from the Pentagon and its evolving plans to defend the United States against terrorists down to local police and fire departments."15 At a recent National Governors Association conference attended by "emergency planners" from 45 states, Clarke said that, "in the future, they will look for our Achilles' heel, and it's here—here in the homeland."16 At the conference, Clarke and Attorney General Janet Reno outlined various ways in which that "defense" is coming together, including congressional approval for President Clinton to recall (involuntarily) 200,000 reservists for up to 270 days. The National Guard and Reserve Units have been designated as among the "first responders" in the event of an "incident."

On May 22, 1998, Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced "the stationing plan for 10 recently announced rapid assessment elements using National Guard personnel." According to Cohen, the Guard teams, at a cost of some $50 million, "are part of Department of Defense's overall effort to support local, state, and federal civil authorities in the event of an incident involving the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on U.S. soil." The teams, placed in the regions designated by FEMA, are stationed in California, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Washington. The plan is that within four hours' time they "will be able to deploy rapidly ... and pave the way for the identification and arrival of follow- on federal response assets." According to Cohen, they "will act as the tip of the national military spear." In support of this plan, Cohen called for the "total force" "integration" of the National Guard and "other Reserve components" into "a national WMD preparedness strategy."17 New York's Governor George Pataki, enamored over the new role of the New York National Guard, which had been "developing the doctrine of homeland defense over the past year and a half," stated on July 20, 1998, that "with the Guard stronger than ever, the creation of this unit is a right step at the right time."18 New York is part of FEMA Region II, which consists of New York, New Jersey, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

Some months earlier, the DOD released Department of Defense Plan for Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction, spelling out the particulars on the subject of National Guard/Reserve "integration." Among its numerous chapters, a section entitled "Response Elements: Civil Disturbances" states that "the potential for lawlessness and disorder will exist following any WMD incident. Units designated with on- street civil disturbance missions need to have awareness level training on WMD incidents."19 In this regard, the report references not only the Posse Comitatus Act and the Insurrection Act (Title 10 U.S.C. §§331- 35), but also DOD Directive 3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances. Lt. General Edward Baca, chief of the National Guard Bureau, stated in 1998 that the Guard was ready to implement homeland defense initiatives. "We are now in the process of determining what the threats are so that doctrine can be developed to meet those threats."20 While the "threats" may require determination, the process of militarizing law enforcement to meet the "threats" is clear.

On March 3, 1998, Army Brig. Gen. Roger Schultz, deputy for the Director of Military Support, the DOD agency that coordinates "assistance" to local law enforcement, stated that "we don't know when and we don't know the place, but we will be attacked." Gen. Schultz "sees a nation and citizenry not fully prepared for attacks," and the new Guard program "will help educate the public about its vulnerability." But even more, Schultz wants to make the point that "the task we're going to be training Guard and Reserve soldiers and airmen on is related to our war fighting. We're not just investing in a domestic response, we're investing in a commander in chief's requirement to go to war."21

This past April 27- 29, 1999, the U.S. Army's Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) held its Modeling and Simulation [M&S] Advisory Council and Distributed Simulation Working Group Meeting at the Joint Warfighting Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia. The session took up the issue of "homeland defense" in a series of briefings (slide shows). One such briefing, entitled, "Army Force XXI - New Analysis Requirement," explicitly lists elements of "homeland defense" including "domestic preparedness, weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, civil disorder, evacuations, natural disasters." Stating that "examples of M&S in Support of Domestic Preparedness" include "Operation Test Visualization (OTV)," the briefing explains that OTV "provides real time and playback capability for live or simulated exercises" which "law enforcement agencies agree is needed." Currently, they are busy at work "with the San Bernardino  [California] Sheriff's Department and Boeing to provide training and analysis for Shoot House exercises." These "Soldier Station" scenarios include "MOUT, non- lethal weapons and Land Warrior/Force XXI" elements, as well as "complete search and capture scenarios for the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department." Hands- on "incident command operations" with the San Bernardino Sheriff's Department completed in February 1999 consisted of a "single jurisdiction, multi- agency response to civil disorder."22

In January 1999, the Washington, D.C.- based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) released a study entitled "Defending the U.S. Homeland," which calls for the Pentagon to "develop, deploy, and operate a wide range of defensive measures for the protection of the U.S. homeland." The Center, founded in 1962, is a conservative public policy research institution that maintains resident experts on all the world's major geographical regions. It also covers key functional areas, such as international finance, U.S. domestic and economic policy, and U.S. foreign policy and national security issues. On January 1, 1999, none other than former Senator Sam Nunn assumed the position of chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees. At that time the Center made known its differences with President Clinton's proposals to defend the homeland, stating that "the President's program is useful to cope with isolated terrorist attacks involving biological or nuclear weapons. However, it fails to address the need for the Pentagon to be prepared for taking the lead should a rogue state smuggle such weapons into the United States." The study's author, Fred C. Ikle, former Under Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration, pointed out other shortcomings, such as "inadequate or insufficiently understood legal authorities for a military role in homeland defense," although Ikle believes that "legislation can overcome this deficiency." Towards that end, a future CSIS study intends to "address the legal aspects of the military's role in homeland defense." Dr. Ikle, a CSIS "distinguished scholar," is currently also a director of the National Endowment for Democracy.

The Center's Global Organized Crime Project is chaired by William Webster, former Director of the CIA and FBI. CSIS "Senior Adviser" Arnaud de Borchgrave serves as Project Director. The Project membership lists numerous former intelligence and defense chiefs including former directors Woolsey, Soyster, Schlesinger, Brown, Gates, Deutch, Rumsfeld, and Cohen (prior to his current appointment), as well as CSIS "scholar," Walter Laqueur, co- chair, International Research Council, and holder of the Henry A. Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy. Although the Project believes that "the rise of transnational organized crime is an unfortunate by- product of globalization," its Terrorism Task Force believes that "zealots are arriving on the scene not with traditional political objectives but with more unique idiosyncratic, religious, or personally psychotic purposes." Its members include former FEMA head Lt. Gen. Julius Becton, U.S. Army (ret), and Joshua Lederberg of Rockefeller University.23

Stating that "rogue nations or transnational actors may be able to threaten our homeland," a 1997 report by the National Defense Panel, entitled "Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century," advises that "the terrorist threat to the United States is a complex issue which, as it encroaches upon U.S. territory, transitions from a Defense and State activity to one managed primarily by the Department of Justice or local law enforcement."24

Toward this end, the Attorney General's office has established a National Domestic Preparedness Office within the FBI. Various presidential directives issued over the past two years put the FBI in the lead of counterterrorism activities. At the same time, "the mythic G- men, who once concentrated exclusively on solving crime, are today focusing on crime prevention as never before," making use of greatly "increased investigatory and surveillance powers that have come with its new role."25 Another sign of the FBI's expanded "homeland" mission, to go along with its overseas activities, is the massive infusion of funding it has received. Annual funding for the FBI's Counterterrorism program has grown from $78.5 million in 1993 to $301.2 million in 1999. In 1995, the FBI's Counterterrorism Center, located at FBI Headquarters, became operational. And thus, as President Clinton recently put it, does "the last big kind of organizational piece"26 on "homeland defense" come together.

Endnotes:

1._New York Times, Editorial, Jan. 23, 1999.

2._New York Times, Jan. 28, 1999, p. A21.

3._"Weapons of Mass Destruction, Terrorism, and U.S. Preparedness," statement of Frank J. Cilluffo, Deputy Director, Global Organized Crime Project, Co- Director, Terrorism Task Force, Center for Strategic and International Studies, to the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the U.S. House Committee on Governmental Reform and Oversight, Oct. 2, 1998.

4._Op. cit., n. 2.

5._New York Times, Oct. 8, 1999, p. A16.

6._Ibid.

7._Op. cit., n. 2.

8._"The Threat to the United States Posed by Terrorists," statement of FBI Director Louis J. Freeh before the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Feb. 4, 1999.  Se also, Louis Wolf, "Law Enforcement Intelligence: The New National Security Merger, " CovertAction Quarterly, No. 60 (Spring 1997).

9._Op. cit., n. 2.

10._Colonel Sean J. Berne, U.S. Army, "Defending Sovereignty: Domestic Operations and Legal Precedents," Military Review, Mar.- Apr. 1999.

11._Thomas R. Lujan, "Legal Aspects of Domestic Employment of the Army," Parameters, Autumn 1997.

12._United States Air Force, Air University, course title: "The Posse Comitatus Act: Consideration of Its Contemporary Value/Appropriateness," Summer 1998.

13._U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute, slide, Posse Comitatus Act, 1999.

14._Richard A. Clarke, "The Intelligence Threat Assessment Function and the New Threats," Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Winter 1999).

15._New York Times, Feb. 1, 1999, p. A3.

16._Dallas Morning News, Feb. 9, 1999.